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Online Appendix 
 
Table A1: Summary statistics 
 N Mean Sd Min Max 
Military regime 8569 0.170 0.376 0 1 
Military regime categorical 8569 0.241 0.560 0 2 
Regional rebellion (decay) 16204 0.0442 0.199 0 1 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) 16150 0.0674 0.238 0 1 
Previously experienced regional rebellion  16333 0.101 0.302 0 1 
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion 16333 0.226 0.418 0 1 
Directly following regional rebellion 3834 0.0764 0.266 0 1 
Directly following center-seeking rebellion 3834 0.184 0.388 0 1 
Duration of regional rebellion 9619 0.891 5.057 0 66 
Duration of ideological rebellion 9619 0.796 3.770 0 50 
Regional rebellion (dummy) 9620 0.0681 0.252 0 1 
Center-seeking rebellion (dummy) 9620 0.0984 0.298 0 1 
GDP p.c. (log) 10416 8.365 1.096 5.7 11.5 
Population size (log) 10119 15.22 2.070 9.2 21.0 
Polity 8937 0.625 7.488 -10 10 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) 8829 126.4 94.61 6.2 726.8 
Unrest (log) 9705 0.356 0.676 0 4.5 
War (dummy) 14600 0.0170 0.129 0 1 
Rel. fractionalization  13277 0.442 0.257 0 0.9 
Rents p.c. (log)  9335 2.815 3.013 0 11.4 
Population density  12936 226.2 1395.1 0.5 25322.8 
Trade  7556 76.46 48.32 0.3 531.7 
Post Cold War 9207 0.391 0.488 0 1 
 
  
2 
 
Table A2: Countries included in main model 
Country N Percent Country N Percent 
Afghanistan 25 0.53 Latvia 17 0.36 
Albania 48 1.02 Lebanon 17 0.36 
Algeria 9 0.19 Lesotho 34 0.72 
Angola 32 0.68 Liberia 33 0.7 
Argentina 33 0.7 Libya 9 0.19 
Australia 48 1.02 Lithuania 17 0.36 
Austria 48 1.02 Luxembourg 48 1.02 
Bahrain 37 0.78 Macedonia 16 0.34 
Bangladesh 35 0.74 Madagascar 45 0.95 
Belarus 17 0.36 Malawi 44 0.93 
Belgium 48 1.02 Malaysia 48 1.02 
Benin 23 0.49 Mali 25 0.53 
Bhutan 38 0.8 Mauritania 21 0.44 
Bolivia 31 0.66 Mauritius 40 0.85 
Botswana 42 0.89 Mexico 48 1.02 
Brazil 27 0.57 Moldova 17 0.36 
Bulgaria 48 1.02 Morocco 48 1.02 
Burkina Faso 8 0.17 Mozambique 21 0.44 
Burundi 9 0.19 Myanmar 2 0.04 
Cambodia 29 0.61 Nepal 43 0.91 
Cameroon 48 1.02 Netherlands 48 1.02 
Cape Verde 33 0.7 New Zealand 48 1.02 
Central African Republic 18 0.38 Nicaragua 29 0.61 
Chad 22 0.47 Niger 26 0.55 
Chile 31 0.66 Nigeria 11 0.23 
China 48 1.02 Norway 48 1.02 
Colombia 43 0.91 Oman 48 1.02 
Comoros 27 0.57 Pakistan 12 0.25 
Congo 13 0.28 Panama 28 0.59 
Costa Rica 48 1.02 Papua New Guinea 33 0.7 
Croatia 17 0.36 Paraguay 15 0.32 
Cuba 48 1.02 Peru 27 0.57 
Cyprus 37 0.78 Philippines 46 0.97 
Czech Republic 15 0.32 Poland 38 0.8 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 7 0.15 Portugal 45 0.95 
Denmark 48 1.02 Qatar 37 0.78 
Djibouti 31 0.66 Romania 47 0.99 
Dominican Republic 43 0.91 Russia 16 0.34 
East Timor 6 0.13 Rwanda 12 0.25 
Ecuador 36 0.76 Saudi Arabia 48 1.02 
Egypt 27 0.57 Senegal 48 1.02 
El Salvador 22 0.47 Sierra Leone 34 0.72 
Equatorial Guinea 11 0.23 Singapore 43 0.91 
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Estonia 17 0.36 Slovakia 15 0.32 
Ethiopia 15 0.32 Slovenia 17 0.36 
Fiji 24 0.51 Solomon Islands 29 0.61 
Finland 48 1.02 Somalia 10 0.21 
France 48 1.02 South Africa 47 0.99 
Gabon 48 1.02 South Korea 20 0.42 
Gambia 29 0.61 Spain 31 0.66 
Germany 18 0.38 Sri Lanka 33 0.7 
Ghana 26 0.55 Sudan 2 0.04 
Greece 41 0.87 Suriname 24 0.51 
Guatemala 23 0.49 Swaziland 40 0.85 
Guinea 24 0.51 Sweden 48 1.02 
Guinea-Bissau 18 0.38 Switzerland 48 1.02 
Guyana 38 0.8 Syria 12 0.25 
Haiti 43 0.91 Tanzania 47 0.99 
Honduras 30 0.63 Thailand 30 0.63 
Hungary 47 0.99 Togo 9 0.19 
India 48 1.02 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 46 0.97 
Indonesia 15 0.32 Tunisia 48 1.02 
Iran 48 1.02 Turkey 41 0.87 
Iraq 23 0.49 Uganda 31 0.66 
Ireland 48 1.02 Ukraine 17 0.36 
Israel 48 1.02 
United Arab 
Emirates 37 0.78 
Italy 48 1.02 United Kingdom 48 1.02 
Ivory Coast 39 0.83 Uruguay 36 0.76 
Jamaica 47 0.99 Venezuela 48 1.02 
Japan 48 1.02 Vietnam 17 0.36 
Jordan 48 1.02 Yugoslavia 2 0.04 
Kenya 45 0.95 Zambia 44 0.93 
Kuwait 40 0.85 Zimbabwe 37 0.78 
Laos 36 0.76    
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Descriptive patterns for H1 and H2 
In addition to presenting the findings from our quantitative models, we explore if our 
hypotheses are supported by patterns in descriptive data. Figure A1 displays the relative 
frequency of regional rebellions for three types of regime transitions: transitions toward 
military regimes, civilian autocracies, and democracies. In the case of transitions to military 
regimes, the mean of Regional rebellion (decay) over the measurement period is 15 and 25 
percent higher than for transitions to civilian autocracy and democracy respectively, suggesting 
that military regimes emerge more often from regional rebellions; second, more transitions to 
military regimes are directly preceded by a regional rebellion than transitions to other regimes; 
third, about 15 percent of all transitions to military regimes occur in countries which at some 
point experienced a regional rebellion, while the equivalent shares in transitions to civilian 
autocracy and democracy lie around 6 and 8 percent respectively. Taken together, the data 
suggest that, in line with H1, regime transitions in the wake of regional rebellions are more 
likely to yield military rule. 
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Figure A1: Regional rebellions and regime transitions 
Note: “Previously experienced regional rebellions” means occurrence of a regional rebellion 
at some point in the past; “directly following regional rebellions” means a regional rebellion 
occurred in the previous year. Data on regime types taken from Svolik (2012); rebellion data 
from Gleditsch et al. (2002).  
 
Figure A2 presents descriptive evidence for our second hypothesis on the intensity of 
regional conflict and the level of regime militarization. It shows that in regimes under direct 
military rule the average years of experienced regional rebellions – the mean of our duration 
measure – is more than three times higher than in democracies, civilian autocracies, or regimes 
under indirect military rules. This is a first indication that more intense regional conflicts leads 
to greater militarization of regimes in the form of direct military rule.  
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Figure A2: Intensity of regional conflict and regime militarization 
 
Note: Data on regime types taken from Svolik (2012); rebellion data from Gleditsch et al. 
(2002).  
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Modelling military regime democratization 
While military regimes have, on average, had shorter spells than other regime types (Geddes 
1999a), there is actually considerable variation across military regimes, for which our theory 
provides a potential explanation (Croissant and Kuehn 2016; Kim and Kroeger 2018). Our third 
hypothesis is thus as follows: Our theoretical argument implies that regional rebellions prompt 
militaries to hold on to power longer rather than handing it back quickly to civilian elites as 
their motivation and capacity to do so is stronger. Specifically, we hypothesize the following: 
H3: Military regimes arising in the wake of regional rebellions or exposed to regional 
rebellions during their spell should withstand pressures for democratization longer than 
other military regimes. 
In terms of descriptive statistics, Figure A3 depicts the average duration of military 
regimes in years differentiated by whether they experienced regional rebellions. In line with 
our expectations in H3, the average duration of all military regimes that have experienced some 
form of regional rebellion is noticeably higher: military regimes that previously experienced a 
regional rebellion last on average four years longer; regimes that directly emerge in the wake 
of a regional rebellion last over six years longer; and military regimes facing a regional 
rebellion during their spell last about two years longer. On the whole, the patterns emerging 
from the descriptive statistics are in line with our theory and inspire confidence in our theory.  
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Figure A3: Regional rebellions and military regime duration 
 
Note: “Previously experienced regional rebellions” means occurrence of a regional rebellion 
at some point in the past; “directly following regional rebellions” means a regional rebellion 
occurred in the previous year; “experienced regional rebellion during spell” means at least one 
regional rebellion occurred during the regime spell. Data on regime types taken from Svolik 
2012; rebellion data from Gleditsch et al. 2002. 
 
To model the effect of regional rebellions on military regimes’ ability to withstand 
democratization (H3) we use a variant of our Markov transition model presented above. Based 
on the theory-generating Southeast Asian cases, we hypothesize two scenarios for military 
regimes to become more resistant to democracy through regional rebellion: first, military 
regimes that either directly emerge out of a regional rebellion – that is, experience one in the 
year preceding regime onset – or that were preceded by regional rebellions at some point in the 
past become more resilient in the face of democratizing forces as the preceding conflict has 
galvanized military elites into a cohesive ruling group; second, military regimes that experience 
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regional rebellions during their spell should also be more resistant to democracy as the cohesion 
of the ruling group is enhanced by conflict. Note that in the latter case military regimes could 
have come to power for reasons other than regional rebellions but then subsequently become 
more resilient as a result of regional rebellion.  
To capture the foundational effect of preceding regional rebellions, we create two new 
variables, henceforth called origin variables: Previously experienced regional rebellion is a 
binary variable taking the value of 1 if a military regime was preceded by a regional rebellion 
at some point before its onset; Directly following regional rebellion is also a binary variable 
indicating whether or not a military regime was preceded by a regional rebellion in the period 
immediately prior to regime onset. Both variables are time-invariant for the duration of a 
military regime spell. The effect of rebellions occurring during a spell are captured by our 
standard decay variables. In terms of the model specification, we follow the setup of the 
Markov transition model with the exception that we now model the transition from a military 
regime to democracy. The equation is as follows:  Pr(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑀𝑖𝑙.  𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 = 1) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿3 +𝛽4𝜗𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡), (3) 
with 𝛼 designating the constant, R our measures of regional rebellions (origin and 
during spell), X a vector of covariates, and 𝛿 regional fixed effects. The event counter 𝜗 
measures the number of previous regime breakdowns, while 𝜇 designates cubic polynomials 
of the time since military regime onset. As before, we lag all variables except for the event 
counter and the regional fixed effects,1 and estimate a pooled as well as a fixed effects logit 
                                                 
1
 Although our origin variables are time-invariant, we use the one-year lag to bring them in line with the lag 
structure of the model. Using the contemporaneous version of these variables yields nearly identical results. 
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model. In the latter, the origin variables are not estimated as they are time-variant so that the 
model uniquely focuses on the effect of regional rebellions occurring during a military spell.2 
Our regressions results are displayed in Table A4. Columns 1 and 2 report the pooled 
logit estimates of the origin variables, while column 3 shows the estimates for rebellions 
occurring during a regime spell only. Columns 4 and 5 show the results when both measures 
of rebellion are added simultaneously into the regression. The conditional logit results are 
shown in Column 6. On the whole, the findings partially support H3. On the one hand, 
rebellions occurring during regime spells significantly reduce the likelihood of a transition to 
democracy. Given a baseline probability of democratization of 3.3 percent in the pooled model, 
the occurrence of a regional rebellions reduces this probability on average by 1.5 percent 
absolutely and 45 percent relatively speaking. The effect then fades out over the five following 
periods (see Figure A4). The conditional logit model which focuses solely on within regime 
variation yields a similarly, slightly stronger finding as significance levels increase. 
 
                                                 
2
 We also tested another variant of the Markov model where we keep Military regime as our dependent variable 
and condition on Military regimet-1 =1. While this model slightly shifts the focus from democratization to 
military regime breakdown more generally, the main finding is the same in that regional rebellions during 
regime spells increase the durability of military regimes. Results are available upon request. 
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Figure A4: Effect of regional rebellion on military regime democratization 
 
Note: Marginal effects derived from Table A4, column 5. Regional rebellion set at 1, 0.5, 0.25, 
0.125, and 0.0625 according to decay function. All other covariates set at their observed values 
(Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013). 
 
On the other hand, our expectation that regimes emerging out of, or in contexts preceded 
by regional rebellions are more stable, does not bear out. In fact, all signs are positive except 
in column 1. The results of column 5 suggest that regimes directly following a regional 
rebellion are more likely to break down than regimes without previous rebellions. This finding 
is somewhat surprising in light of the suggestive descriptive statistics presented at the outset of 
this section. We see two possible reasons for this: First, with a total of three cases (Indonesia, 
Mauritania, Myanmar), military regimes arising directly in the wake of regional rebellion are 
relatively rare in our data, and while their spell is comparatively long (32, 26, and 47 years 
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respectively), the model might struggle to produce clear results from so few positive 
observations. Second, a number of regimes are double-coded as having both regional and 
center-seeking rebellions prior to their onset (see Table A3). This is, amongst others, the case 
for Myanmar – one of the most long-lasting military dictatorships. As a result, differentiating 
the effect of center-seeking and regional rebellions at the origin of military regimes is 
complicated because of tied data.3 Conversely, given that these tied data bias the results against 
our hypotheses more generally, the fact that in all our models Regional decay has been highly 
significant makes us more confident in the validity of our findings.  
 
Table A3: Regimes with both types of rebellion 
Previously experienced 
regional AND center-
seeking rebellion 
Directly following 
regional AND center-
seeking rebellion 
Comoros (3) Myanmar (46) 
D. R. Congo (26, 3)  
Ethiopia (15, 2)  
Indonesia (32)  
Myanmar (45)  
Niger (1)  
Nigeria (12, 14)  
Pakistan (8)  
Note: Duration of military regime spell in brackets.  
                                                 
3
 In additional tests, we experimented with recoding all tied origin variables as regional rebellions only. This 
removes the positive significant effect of the regional origin variable but still does not show a negative 
significant effect on democratization. Results are available upon request.    
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Table A4: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.759   2.161   
 (1.190)   (1.816)   
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.844   -0.018   
 (0.861)   (1.378)   
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  0.650   2.212  
  (0.879)   (0.965)**  
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  0.029   -0.775  
  (1.483)   (1.343)  
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1   -2.613 -3.884 -1.808 -24.995 
   (1.496)* (1.858)** (0.975)* (6.222)*** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1   1.713 1.930 1.625 -1.636 
   (1.006)* (1.513) (1.131) (2.287) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 0.088 0.497 0.471 0.165 0.558 -1.891 
 (0.807) (1.146) (0.973) (0.765) (0.964) (8.406) 
Population size (log) t-1 -1.501 -0.628 -0.881 -1.361 -0.382 9.899 
 (1.380) (1.180) (1.247) (1.211) (1.002) (6.658) 
Polity t-1 0.814 0.786 0.829 0.854 0.802 1.528 
 (0.099)*** (0.110)*** (0.119)*** (0.134)*** (0.103)*** (0.678)** 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 34.619 14.964 22.660 30.100 9.588 365.337 
 (29.913) (23.793) (26.368) (25.568) (21.430) (347.806) 
Unrest (log) t-1 -0.184 -0.684 -0.187 -0.139 -0.678 -3.729 
 (0.595) (0.661) (0.586) (0.552) (0.554) (3.063) 
War (dummy) t-1 -1.963 -2.434 -2.892 -2.906 -3.342 -3.161 
 (1.387) (1.410)* (1.486)* (1.578)* (1.470)** (2.580) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 4.988 5.747 5.961 5.741 6.710  
 (2.925)* (2.132)*** (2.871)** (2.865)** (2.426)***  
Number of previous regime failures 0.697 0.805 0.671 0.767 0.911 -2.812 
 (0.385)* (0.419)* (0.328)** (0.459)* (0.370)** (1.452)* 
N 1,166 1,023 1,166 1,166 1,023 471 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.
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Separation plots to assess model fit 
The two below figures show separation plots for our two baseline models. Separation 
plots arrange the fitted values in ascending order of probability with each line 
representing one observation (Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks 2011). Red lines are 
observations in which the outcome of interest actually occurs. The added line 
represents the predicted probabilities estimated for each observation. The small 
triangle beneath the plot indicates the expected number of total events predicted. A 
perfectly fitted model would thus have red and yellow lines perfectly separated at the 
position of the triangle, with a sharp corresponding rise in the predicted probability 
line. A very bad model would see the occurrence of actual outcomes at even very low 
levels of predicted probability and a slow gradual increase of the probability line. 
Bearing this in mind, the graphs below demonstrate a good model fit with high levels 
of separation and a visible spike in the predicted probability at the triangle separation 
point. 
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Note: Figure based on column 4, Table 1 in the main article.  
 
 
Note: Figure based on column 3, Table A4 in the Online Appendix.  
 
  
17 
 
General note on robustness tests 
The below section includes the following tests: additional/alternative variables, 
diffusion effects, and alternative time specifications. The tests are carried out for our 
military regime emergence and democratization models. Wherever possible, these 
tests are also carried out for our multinomial logit model of regime militarization.  
 
Mundlak-Chamberlain models 
As an alternative to our conditional logistic fixed effects regressions, we estimate the 
effect of rebellions on the emergence and democratization of military regimes using 
the Mundlak-Chamberlain (Chamberlain 1982; Mundlak 1978) approach. The model 
takes the following functional form:  Pr(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝛼0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑅?̅?) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑋?̅?) + 𝛽3𝑅?̅? +𝛽4𝑋?̅? + +𝛽5𝑌?̅? + 𝛿3 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡),  (1),  
where 𝛼 designates the constant, R our measure of regional rebellions, X a vector 
of covariates (including our event count variable), and 𝛿 regional fixed effects. By 
adding the country means and the yearly deviation from the country means, the model 
enables us to separate cross-country from within-country effects. Note that in Table 
A6 we refrain from adding the yearly deviation for the variables measuring the 
rebellion prior or at regime onset (Previously experienced regional/center-seeking 
rebellion; directly following regional/center-seeking rebellion) as these are highly 
collinear with our standard measure of Regional/Center-seeking rebellion. 
Additionally, we add the country mean of our dependent variable Y, which allows us 
to account for unit heterogeneity by, effectively, adding a varying intercept (Wright, 
Frantz, and Geddes 2015). We also add 𝜇, a vector of cubic time polynomials to 
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account for duration dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010). As before, all variables 
except for regional fixed effects and the event counter are lagged by one year to 
mitigate endogeneity concerns and ensure the correct order of causal dependence.  
The results for military regime emergence are shown in Table A5. In line with our 
baseline model, the model finds that within-country changes of regional rebellions 
significantly increase the likelihood of military regime emergence. The effect is 
illustrated in the marginal effects plot in Figure A5. By contrast, cross-country 
differences in the average level of regional rebellions are not associated with a higher 
likelihood of military regime emergence, suggesting that our finding is driven by 
within-country variation of regional rebellions over time.  
The results for military regime democratization are shown in Table A6. None of 
the variables for regional rebellions is significant. As we explain in the article, this is 
most probably due to tied data for regimes that experience both a regional and a center-
seeking rebellion prior to regime onset.  
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Table A5: Mundlak-Chamberlain estimation of military regime emergence 
 (1) (2) 
Regional rebellion (decay, mean) -0.558 -0.682 
 
(0.979) (1.569) 
Regional rebellion t-1 (decay, dev) 1.607 1.308 
 
(0.762)** (0.755)* 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay, mean) 1.476 0.496 
 
(0.671)** (0.649) 
Center-seeking rebellion t-1 (decay, dev) 0.391 0.077 
 
(0.540) (0.607) 
GDP p.c. (log, mean) -0.042 -0.218 
 
(0.286) (0.261) 
GDP p.c. t-1 (log, dev) -0.036 -0.071 
 
(0.533) (0.553) 
Population size (log, mean) 0.201 0.292 
 
(0.292) (0.300) 
Population size t-1 (log, dev) 2.661 3.659 
 
(0.849)*** (0.876)*** 
Polity (mean) 0.043 0.162 
 
(0.050) (0.078)** 
Polity t-1 (dev) -0.265 -0.365 
 
(0.050)*** (0.064)*** 
Mil. capabilities (cube root, mean) -7.251 -5.096 
 
(8.429) (7.096) 
Mil. capabilities t-1 (cube root, dev) -16.044 -18.931 
 
(18.689) (19.885) 
Unrest (log, mean) 0.881 1.008 
 
(0.769) (0.671) 
Unrest t-1 (log, dev) 0.215 -0.012 
 
(0.203) (0.226) 
War (dummy, mean) 4.432 3.892 
 
(3.496) (2.916) 
War t-1 (dummy, dev) 0.746 -0.027 
 
(0.741) (0.886) 
Rel. fractionalization (mean) -0.793 -0.211 
 
(0.841) (0.725) 
Previous failures (mean) 0.147 -0.011 
 
(0.029)*** (0.043) 
Previous failures (dev) -0.191 -0.128 
 
(0.031)*** (0.022)*** 
Y (mean)  8.353 
  
(1.720)*** 
NxT 4,630 4,630 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Mundlak-Chamberlain logistic regression with cluster-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Mean designates the country averages, dev designates the annual 
deviation from country averages. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figure A5: Effect of within-country changes in regional rebellions 
 
Note: Marginal effects derived from Table A5, column 1. All other covariates set at 
their observed values (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013).  
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Table A6: Mundlak-Chamberlain estimation of military regime democratization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion (mean) 2.777   10.831  
 (3.403)   (9.747)  
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion (mean) -1.022   -5.283  
 (1.256)   (3.448)  
Directly following regional rebellion (mean)  0.901   -18.083 
  (4.173)   (32.346) 
Directly following center-seeking rebellion (mean)  -1.847   -3.842 
  (2.227)   (5.472) 
Regional rebellion (decay, mean)   -4.167 -18.157 8.392 
   (8.185) (14.272) (21.409) 
Regional rebellion t-1 (decay, dev)   -30.648 -6.200 -71.368 
   (43.700) (13.656) (54.773) 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay, mean)   11.036 20.118 19.620 
   (7.938) (10.891)* (9.216)** 
Center-seeking rebellion t-1 (decay, dev)   2.886 3.987 2.456 
   (1.757) (2.431) (1.736) 
Y (mean) 44.420 51.410 -30.814 -41.172 -93.795 
 (40.531) (47.585) (38.599) (48.098) (64.942) 
NxT 1,166 1,151 1,166 1,166 1,151 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlak-Chamberlain logistic regression with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Mean designates the country averages, dev 
designates the annual deviation from country averages. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Dummy instead of decaying variables for rebellion 
To ascertain that our findings are not purely an artefact of our decaying measure of 
rebellions, we re-run our baseline models for military regime emergence and 
democratization using a simple dummy indicator of rebellion. The variable measures 
if a regional or center-seeking rebellion occurred in the previous year. The results are 
shown in Table A7 and Table A8.  
As expected, constraining the effect of rebellions to one period weakens the 
association between regional rebellions and military regime emergence and 
democratization. That said, the pattern we have seen when using decaying variables 
reemerges when using simple dummies: In Table A7, only columns 4 and 5 are slightly 
insignificant, but with p=0.105 and 0.125 respectively reasonably close given that we 
are using a much coarser measure of regional rebellions. And in Table A8, we find a 
similar pattern to our baseline democratization model, suggesting that regional 
rebellions occurring during a military regime spell significantly decrease the 
likelihood of democratization. This is particularly the case when focusing on within-
country variation only (Table A8, column 6), which is, as we know from Table A5, 
the main driver of our finding.  
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Table A7: Regional rebellions (dummy) and military regime emergence  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional rebellion (dummy) t-1 0.849 0.859 0.750 0.709 1.421 
 
(0.457)* (0.455)* (0.455)* (0.438) (0.920) 
Center-seeking rebellion (dummy) t-1 0.422 0.422 0.320 0.281 0.918 
 
(0.336) (0.336) (0.317) (0.324) (0.610) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.166 -0.167 -0.179 0.001 -0.952 
 
(0.240) (0.239) (0.235) (0.267) (0.852) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.057 0.058 0.006 0.379 2.455 
 
(0.126) (0.123) (0.122) (0.213)* (2.106) 
Polity t-1 -0.125 -0.126 -0.140 -0.152 -0.408 
 
(0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.035)*** (0.098)*** 
Previous failures 0.181 0.182 0.156 0.114 -0.926 
 
(0.211) (0.212) (0.235) (0.249) (0.945) 
War (dummy) t-1  -0.114 0.054 0.385 0.383 
  
(0.766) (0.746) (0.734) (1.053) 
Unrest (log) t-1   0.483 0.519 -0.102 
   
(0.150)*** (0.153)*** (0.306) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1   -1.562 -1.678  
   
(0.692)** (0.746)** 
 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -10.067 -12.692 
    
(5.041)** (32.218) 
NxT 4,704 4,704 4,613 4,612 1,301 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-4. Conditional logit model in column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A8: Regional rebellions (dummy) and military regime democratization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.759   1.575   
 
(1.190) 
  
(1.421) 
  
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.844   0.611   
 
(0.861) 
  
(1.053) 
  
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  0.650   1.686  
 
 (0.879) 
 
 (0.983)* 
 
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  0.029   -0.374  
 
 (1.483) 
 
 (1.582) 
 
Regional rebellion (dummy) t-1   -2.286 -3.422 -1.233 -16.375 
 
 
 
(1.491) (1.765)* (1.023) (2.434)*** 
Center-seeking rebellion (dummy) t-1   1.160 1.047 0.822 -3.039 
 
 
 
(1.116) (1.364) (1.338) (2.106) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 0.088 0.497 0.388 0.209 0.490 -4.731 
 
(0.807) (1.146) (0.942) (0.754) (1.034) (7.567) 
Population size (log) t-1 -1.501 -0.628 -0.949 -1.368 -0.523 7.758 
 
(1.380) (1.180) (1.215) (1.268) (1.032) (10.625) 
Polity t-1 0.814 0.786 0.815 0.821 0.790 1.989 
 
(0.099)*** (0.110)*** (0.109)*** (0.105)*** (0.101)*** (0.750)*** 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 34.619 14.964 23.762 30.289 12.450 481.046 
 
(29.913) (23.793) (25.888) (27.057) (21.284) (291.278)* 
Unrest (log) t-1 -0.184 -0.684 -0.170 -0.131 -0.657 -4.846 
 
(0.595) (0.661) (0.599) (0.584) (0.607) (2.408)** 
War (dummy) t-1 -1.963 -2.434 -2.583 -2.744 -2.903 -4.279 
 
(1.387) (1.410)* (1.567)* (1.582)* (1.568)* (2.346)* 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 4.988 5.747 5.707 5.148 6.195  
 
(2.925)* (2.132)*** (2.746)** (2.855)* (2.242)*** 
 
Number of previous regime failures 0.697 0.805 0.638 0.763 0.852 -2.662 
 
(0.385)* (0.419)* (0.318)** (0.367)** (0.412)** (1.451)* 
NxT 1,166 1,023 1,166 1,166 1,023 471 
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Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Using coups as dependent variable 
As we argue in the paper, the concept of militarization overlaps with but is not identical to 
military coups. To test the degree of overlap empirically, we rerun our baseline logit model 
using a binary indicator for coups instead of militarized regimes as our dependent variable. 
We test coup data from the Powell and Thyne (2011) (column 1) and Marshall and Marshall 
(2014) (column 2). We would expect the direction of the sign and strength of the sign to be 
similar. This is precisely what Table A9 shows. Like in our baseline model, the coefficient 
of Regional rebellion is positive; the association is slightly weaker when using the Powell 
and Thyne dataset with p=0.15. 
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Table A9: Regional rebellions and military coups 
 (1) (2) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.384 0.514 
 
(0.264) (0.260)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 0.238 0.297 
 
(0.153) (0.138)** 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.358 -0.397 
 
(0.100)*** (0.090)*** 
Population size (log) t-1 0.006 -0.069 
 
(0.109) (0.098) 
Polity t-1 -0.007 -0.012 
 
(0.012) (0.011) 
War (dummy) t-1 -0.099 0.169 
 
(0.410) (0.332) 
Unrest (log) t-1 0.303 0.336 
 
(0.106)*** (0.093)*** 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 -0.278 -0.071 
 
(0.299) (0.288) 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 -1.573 -2.121 
 
(2.660) (2.621) 
Number of previous coups 0.002 0.014 
 
(0.019) (0.021) 
NxT 6,263 6,260 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Column 1 
uses the Powell and Thyne data; column 2 uses the Marshall and Marshall data * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Testing the effect of rebellion distance to capital 
The proposed disalignment mechanism implies strong information asymmetries between 
civilian and military elites as a result of the distance between the regional rebellion and urban 
centers, especially the capital. An observable implication of this mechanism is that the effect 
of regional rebellions on the likelihood of military regime emergence should increase the 
farther the rebellion is away from the capital. We test this corollary using the geocoded 
version of the PRIO conflict dataset (1946-2005; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; 
Gleditsch et al. 2002). The new distance-weighted variables measure the distance of a 
rebellion from the capital city, with 0 indicating no rebellion, 1 a rebellion in the capital city, 
and further integers signifying larger distances from the capital. The results are shown in 
Table A10 below and strongly confirm our prior. The coefficient of Regional rebellion is 
strongly positively significant, meaning the farther a rebel a regional rebellion is away from 
the capital, the more likely the emergence of a military regime becomes. This effect is 
illustrated graphically in below. Interestingly, while the effect is only weakly significant, 
even center-seeking rebellion begin to exhibit a similar pattern once their distance to the 
capital city is taken into account and, as our theory predicts, information asymmetries 
become more salient.  
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Table A10: Rebellion distance and military regime emergence 
 (1) 
Regional rebellion (distance-weighted) t-1 0.001 
 
(0.000)*** 
Center-seeking rebellion (distance-weighted) t-1 0.004 
 
(0.002)* 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.009 
 
(0.280) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.402 
 
(0.211)* 
Polity t-1 -0.160 
 
(0.038)*** 
War (dummy) t-1 0.042 
 
(0.733) 
Unrest (log) t-1 0.488 
 
(0.167)*** 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 -1.756 
 
(0.786)** 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 -10.661 
 
(5.053)** 
Previous failures 0.144 
 
(0.234) 
NxT 4,612 
Time polynomials Yes 
Regional dummies Yes 
Pooled logit model with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figure A6: Capital distance of rebellions and militarized regimes 
 
Note: Marginal effects derived from Table A10, column 1. All other covariates set at their 
observed values (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013). 
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Instrumental variable approach 
A potential source of bias is endogeneity and reversed causality. Military repression, for 
example, might aggravate regional grievances, thus leading to regional rebellions rather than 
vice-versa. Indeed, Fjelde (2010) finds that military regimes are more likely to become 
involved in civil wars. Moreover, both regional rebellions and military regimes might be 
jointly associated with an uncontrolled omitted confounder. Depending on the strength of 
endogeneity and/or reverse causality, both scenarios could considerably bias our findings. 
The standard econometric approach to this problem has been to use instrumental variables. 
Finding instruments that are both sufficiently predictive and only influence the outcome Y 
through its effect on X (exclusion restriction) is often challenging, however (Bollen 2012; 
Sovey and Green 2011). In our case, this challenge is aggravated by the fact that we need to 
instrument for two endogenous predictors as both regional and center-seeking rebellions can 
plausibly be considered endogenous and/or in a reverse-causal relationship with military 
regimes. 
We believe to have identified two instruments that fulfil the stringent conditions for 
instrumental variables: First, taking into account the emphasis the civil war literature has 
placed on the geographical conditions conducive to civil wars (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003), 
we turn to terrain characteristics as an instrument. Both center-seeking and separatist rebels 
will have to hide at times from government forces, which can be greatly facilitated or 
complicated by the shape of the terrain. The varying availability of hideouts is thus likely to 
play some role in the decision of whether or not to mount a rebellion. We therefore use 
Rugged terrain in (thousands of) ha (log) t-1 taken from Nunn and Puga (2012) as our first 
instrument. Second, building on the insights from diffusion arguments of macro-social 
outcomes (Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Miller 2015), we use the number of Battle-related 
deaths in neighboring countries t-1 as an instrument for regional and center-seeking 
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rebellion. Our logic relies on an implicit deterrence mechanism from large-scale human 
losses in neighboring countries on potential rebels.  Neighborhood is defined as all 
contiguous states not separated by more than 24 miles of water.4 We use the Correlates of 
War Direct Contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al. 2002, v3.2) to construct these variables. 
Could it be that that terrain characteristics and battle-related deaths in the neighborhood 
have a direct effect on military regime emergence or breakdown that is not mediated by 
domestic rebellion? Existing theory does not suggest this. Geography can plausibly be 
considered as exogenous. As for the second instrument, violence in neighboring countries 
could certainly increase the readiness of domestic military units in order to prevent spill-
over effects; yet the mechanisms that would lead from, say, increased border patrols to a 
military takeover seem to be rather obscure.  
Technically, we conduct our instrumental variable regression using a limited-
information maximum likelihood estimator (LIML) as such estimators have been shown to 
be more robust to weak instrumental variable bias (Stock and Yogo 2005).5 Fortunately, all 
our F statistics meet the Stock-Yogo (2005) critical value on instrument strength. This 
suggests a rather strong predictive power of our instruments, so that any potential weak 
instrument bias will be limited. The results of the IV regressions are shown in Table A11. 
In line with our baseline model, regional rebellions remain a strong predictor for the 
emergence of military regimes. We do not recover, however, our previous finding regarding 
military regime democratization: while the sign of regional rebellion remains negative, the 
coefficient is far from statistical significance. This emphasizes the merely indicative nature 
of our finding on democratization at this stage.   
                                                 
4
 This is one of the possible operationalizations of contiguity proposed in the dataset. Results are similar for 
alternative definitions of contiguity and are available upon request.  
5
 We use the ivreg2 command in Stata to run these regressions. 
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Table A11: Regional conflict and military regime emergence/democratization (IV 
approach) 
 (1) (2) 
Second stage outcome Military regime 
emergence 
Military regime 
democratization 
   
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.232** -0.0434 
 (0.112) (0.180) 
   
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 -0.201 0.0274 
 (0.151) (0.0787) 
First stage outcome Regional rebellion 
decay t-1 
Regional rebellion 
decay t-1 
   
Battle-related deaths in neighboring countries t-1 -0.004*** -0.0084** 
 (0.0015) (0.004) 
   
Rugged terrain in ha (log) t-1 0.0054 0.0085 
 (0.0033) (0.0069) 
First stage outcome Center-seeking 
rebellion decay t-1 
Center-seeking 
rebellion decay t-1 
   
Battle-related deaths in neighboring countries t-1 0.0015 0.0020 
 (0.0022) (0.0058) 
   
Rugged terrain in ha (log) t-1 0.0065** 0.0441*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0159) 
N x T second stage 4,889 1,093 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  7.73 11.62 
Stock-Yogo critical value 7.03 7.03 
Two-stage instrumental variable regression with limited-information maximum likelihood 
estimator (LIML) and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic and the Stock-Yogo critical values are taken from a model assuming 
conditional homoscedasticity as the Stock-Yogo test is only valid in the presence of i.i.d. 
errors. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Additional control variables 
As it is standard practice, we test the robustness of our baseline models to the addition of 
further control variables. Specifically, we add Oil rents (log) (Ross 2013), Population 
density (UNDP 2015), Trade/GDP (World Bank 2017), a dummy for the post-Cold War 
period (Post Cold War), and a measure of the prior regime type (Prior regime) (Svolik 2012) 
to the regression. The latter is a categorical variable measuring if a regime is autocratic, 
democratic, or there was no authority. These additional variables aim to take into account 
that (i) military regimes might be more likely to emerge in resource-abundant countries; (ii) 
civilian involvement in counter-insurgency might be more likely in more densely populated 
areas, decreasing the likelihood of military regime emergence; (iii) more open economies 
might exhibit more volatile business cycles, ensuing instability and potentially military take-
overs or regime breakdowns; (iv) military regimes might be less likely to emerge in the post-
Cold War era; and (v) certain regime types might be more likely to transition into military 
rule. We run all these regressions using Ethnic fractionalization instead of religious 
fractionalization as control variable to make sure our findings are robust to ethnic diversity 
(Alesina et al. 2003).  
In the light of the results displayed in Table A12-Table A14, our main findings appear 
practically unchanged by these additional variables. Regional rebellions remain a highly 
significant predictor of military take-overs; and regional rebellions occurring during a 
regime spell tend to decrease the likelihood of military regime democratization. The latter 
finding seems to be particularly driven by within-country variation (see the conditional logit 
model in Table A14, column 6). As before, our expectation that regimes emerging out of or 
in contexts of regional rebellions is not supported by the model, as shown by the positive 
significant effect for Previously experienced regional rebellion and Directly following 
regional rebellion. As we discussed in the article, while we are puzzled by these findings in 
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the light of strong descriptive patterns, the absence of a clear finding might have to do with 
the effect of ties in our data.   
As for the multinomial logit model on regime militarization (Table A13), the effect of 
rebellion intensity remains highly significant in the unrestricted sample (column 1). In the 
restricted sample (column 2) for military regimes only, the coefficient of Duration of 
regional rebellion becomes slightly insignificant (p=0.155). At the same, we lose about 150 
observations in this regression compared to our baseline model, which is likely to be driving 
the loss of significance.  
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Table A12: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (additional controls) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.923 0.950 1.159 1.129 0.913 2.041 
 
(0.420)** (0.416)** (0.478)** (0.488)** (0.536)* (1.022)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 0.171 0.200 0.256 0.293 0.147 1.366 
 
(0.353) (0.354) (0.379) (0.380) (0.428) (0.943) 
Ethnic fractionalization t-1 1.175 0.736 0.665 0.698 1.099  
 
(0.738) (0.742) (0.772) (0.773) (0.732)  
Oil rents (log) t-1 -0.082 -0.088 -0.043 -0.041 -0.064 0.372 
 
(0.061) (0.062) (0.071) (0.070) (0.068) (0.396) 
Pop. density t-1  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.039 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.053) 
Trade/GDP t-1   -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 0.010 
   
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) 
Post Cold War    -0.408 -0.524 -0.540 
    
(0.355) (0.365) (1.062) 
Prior regime: Autocracy t-1     -1.434 0.256 
(baseline cat.: democracy)     (0.713)** (0.953) 
Prior regime: No authority t-1     -0.819 -0.516 
(baseline cat.: democracy)     (0.997) (1.615) 
NxT 4,605 4,605 4,092 4,092 4,092 1,099 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A13: Regional rebellions and regime militarization (additional controls) 
  (1) (2) 
Indirect Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.041  
Military  (0.043)  
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.018  
  
(0.029) 
 
 Ethnic fractionalization t-1 -0.027  
  
(0.632) 
 
 Oil rents (log) t-1 -0.003  
  
(0.057) 
 
 Pop. density t-1 -0.000  
  
(0.001) 
 
 Trade/GDP t-1 0.003  
  
(0.004) 
 
 Post Cold War 0.191  
  
(0.269) 
 
 Prior regime: Autocracy t-1 0.165  
 (baseline cat.: democracy) (0.355)  
 Prior regime: No authority t-1 -1.234  
 (baseline cat.: democracy) (0.588)**  
Direct Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.117 0.073 
Military  (0.028)*** (0.051) 
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.108 -0.125 
  
(0.034)*** (0.049)** 
 Ethnic fractionalization t-1 -0.430 -0.324 
  
(1.029) (1.303) 
 Oil rents (log) t-1 -0.131 -0.141 
  
(0.088) (0.117) 
 Pop. density t-1 -0.004 -0.005 
  
(0.003) (0.004) 
 Trade/GDP t-1 -0.003 -0.006 
  
(0.005) (0.006) 
 Post Cold War -0.906 -1.181 
  
(0.443)** (0.538)** 
 Prior regime: Autocracy t-1 -0.042 -0.669 
 (baseline cat.: democracy) (0.386) (0.456) 
 Prior regime: No authority t-1 -0.817 -0.103 
 (baseline cat.: democracy) (0.704) (0.650) 
NxT 5,355 1,057 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Regional dummies No No 
Mil. regime t-1=1 No Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes 
Multinomial logit regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Column 1 unrestricted 
sample, base category: non-military regimes. Column 2 restricted sample on military 
regimes only, base category: indirect military rule. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A14: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (additional variables) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 4.324   7.108   
 
(2.125)** 
  
(2.027)*** 
  
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.368   -1.079   
 
(0.721) 
  
(0.972) 
  
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  9.346   6.067  
 
 (4.266)** 
 
 (1.875)*** 
 
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  3.213   3.682  
 
 (1.896)* 
 
 (2.057)* 
 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1   -0.451 -3.883 5.356 -97.412 
 
 
 
(1.296) (1.544)** (5.679) (44.847)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1   1.997 2.601 -1.628 -9.563 
 
 
 
(1.578) (2.153) (1.804) (7.867) 
Ethnic fractionalization t-1 5.538 7.816 4.679 4.846 9.420  
 
(3.747) (4.158)* (3.292) (3.489) (4.908)*  
Oil rents (log) t-1 -0.805 -1.778 -0.596 -0.988 -2.048 -2.511 
 
(0.324)** (0.786)** (0.291)** (0.352)*** (0.916)** (1.526)* 
Pop. density t-1 0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.001 1.316 
 
(0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.722)* 
Trade/GDP t-1 -0.022 -0.028 -0.006 -0.030 -0.045  
 
(0.017) (0.010)*** (0.012) (0.015)** (0.019)** 
 
Post Cold War -1.354 -3.513 -2.148 -0.858 -3.959 12.621 
 
(0.994) (2.303) (1.050)** (0.764) (2.762) (7.103)* 
NxT 1,029 900 1,029 1,029 900 471 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reginal dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Controlling for diffusion effects  
There is ample evidence that democratization is driven, in part, by regional diffusion 
effects (e.g. Elkins and Simmons 2005; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Patel, Bunce, and 
Wolchik 2014). Similar dynamics can be imagined for the emergence of specific 
authoritarian regime types, such as military regimes. To ensure that our findings are 
not driven by diffusion, we control for the percentage of military regimes in 
neighborhood in our emergence regressions, and the percentage of democratic 
regimes in neighborhood for our democratization models. Neighborhood is defined as 
all contiguous states not separated by more than 24 miles of water. We use the 
Correlates of War Direct Contiguity dataset to construct these variables (Stinnett et al. 
2002, v3.2). The results of this robustness test, shown in Table A15-Table A17, are 
substantively identical to those from our baseline models.  
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Table A15: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (diffusion 
effects) 
 (1) (2) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.861 2.241 
 
(0.445)* (0.986)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 -0.034 0.851 
 
(0.328) (0.702) 
% mil. regimes in neighborhood (contiguous) t-
1 
1.487 4.243 
 
(0.407)*** (1.209)*** 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.116 -0.781 
 
(0.298) (0.745) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.062 3.500 
 
(0.284) (1.921)* 
Polity t-1 -0.156 -0.412 
 
(0.036)*** (0.110)*** 
War (dummy) t-1 0.324 0.375 
 
(0.742) (1.049) 
Unrest (log) t-1 0.477 -0.031 
 
(0.170)*** (0.285) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 -1.470  
 
(0.739)** 
 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 -0.031 -13.701 
 
(8.033) (33.551) 
Previous failures 0.084 -1.731 
 
(0.253) (0.822)** 
NxT 4,292 1,205 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in column 1. Conditional logit model in column 2. Cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Table A16: Regional rebellions and regime militarization (diffusion effects) 
  (1) (2) 
Indirect Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.008  
Military  (0.041)  
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.011  
  
(0.031) 
 
 % mil. regimes in neighborhood (contiguous) t-1 1.143  
  
(0.431)*** 
 
Direct Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.116 0.116 
Military  (0.027)*** (0.051)** 
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.142 -0.143 
  
(0.030)*** (0.052)*** 
 % mil. regimes in neighborhood (contiguous) t-1 1.257 0.053 
  
(0.476)*** (0.593) 
NxT 5,355 1,057 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Regional dummies No No 
Mil. regime t-1=1 No Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes 
Multinomial logit regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Column 1 unrestricted 
sample, base category: non-military regimes. Column 2 restricted sample on military 
regimes only, base category: indirect military rule. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A17: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (diffusion effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.809   2.208   
 
(2.069) 
  
(2.460) 
  
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 1.373   0.624   
 
(0.999) 
  
(1.595) 
  
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  0.240   1.854  
  
(0.977) 
  
(1.367) 
 
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  0.115   -0.667  
  
(1.577) 
  
(1.461) 
 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1   -2.640 -4.084 -1.583 -21.809 
   
(1.494)* (2.212)* (1.195) (3.192)*** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1   1.832 1.759 1.511 -1.682 
   
(1.060)* (1.488) (1.423) (1.988) 
% dem. regimes in neighborhood (contiguous) t-1 -1.074 1.307 -0.773 -1.037 0.134 10.784 
 
(1.919) (2.009) (1.839) (1.877) (2.455) (3.794)*** 
NxT 1,146 1,003 1,146 1,146 1,003 457 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Alternative times specifications 
We test the sensitivity of our baseline models to alternative time specifications in 
Table A18-Table A20 below. Specifically, we rerun the models using cubic splines, 
the log of time, and decade dummies with time polynomials. Our main findings remain 
substantively unchanged.  
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Table A18: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (alternative time specifications) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Logit Clogit Logit Clogit Logit Clogit 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.940 2.309 0.931 2.358 0.913 2.303 
 
(0.428)** (1.004)** (0.424)** (0.910)*** (0.424)** (1.197)* 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 0.324 1.147 0.205 1.049 0.392 0.916 
 
(0.346) (0.749) (0.349) (0.674) (0.349) (0.846) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.005 -0.876 0.016 -0.244 -0.012 -1.017 
 
(0.269) (0.836) (0.257) (0.750) (0.273) (0.953) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.362 2.820 0.380 4.827 0.371 1.776 
 
(0.212)* (2.020) (0.211)* (1.977)** (0.223)* (2.269) 
Polity t-1 -0.152 -0.420 -0.161 -0.379 -0.135 -0.390 
 
(0.036)*** (0.096)*** (0.035)*** (0.083)*** (0.037)*** (0.104)*** 
War (dummy) t-1 0.379 0.368 0.319 0.363 0.306 0.197 
 
(0.728) (1.084) (0.753) (0.994) (0.745) (0.911) 
Unrest (log) t-1 0.544 -0.071 0.533 -0.064 0.507 -0.154 
 
(0.154)*** (0.308) (0.153)*** (0.274) (0.155)*** (0.299) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 -1.691  -1.689  -1.450  
 
(0.747)** 
 
(0.751)** 
 
(0.752)* 
 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 -10.215 -19.317 -10.535 -32.703 -11.705 -22.140 
 
(5.011)** (29.699) (4.923)** (33.536) (5.220)** (37.913) 
Previous failures 0.165 -1.001 0.104 -1.863 0.463 -1.542 
 
(0.242) (1.002) (0.262) (0.938)** (0.293) (0.942) 
NxT 4,630 1,301 4,630 1,301 4,630 1,301 
Cubic splines Yes Yes No No No No 
Log of time No No Yes Yes No No 
Decade dummies No No No No Yes Yes 
Time polynomials No No No No Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1, 3, and 5. Conditional logit model in column 2, 4, and 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A19: Regional rebellions and regime militarization (alternative time specifications) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indirect Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.019 0.015 0.021    
Military  (0.046) (0.042) (0.036)    
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.020 -0.019 -0.018    
  
(0.033) (0.031) (0.029) 
   
Direct Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.119 0.120 0.112 0.116 0.116 0.098 
Military  (0.032)*** (0.025)*** (0.028)*** (0.050)** (0.050)** (0.037)*** 
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.142 -0.148 -0.150 -0.144 -0.144 -0.142 
  
(0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.027)*** (0.051)*** (0.050)*** (0.041)*** 
NxT 6,052 6,052 6,052 1,200 1,200 1,200 
Cubic splines Yes No No Yes No No 
Log of time No Yes No No Yes No 
Decade dummies No No Yes No No Yes 
Time polynomials No No Yes No No Yes 
Regional dummies No No No No No No 
Mil. regime t-1=1 No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Multinomial logit regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Columns 1-3 unrestricted sample, base category: non-military regimes. 
Columns 4-6 restricted sample on military regimes only, base category: indirect military rule. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A20: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (alternative time specifications) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Logit Logit Clogit Logit Logit Clogit Logit Logit Clogit 
Prev. exp. regional rebellion t-1 2.485   1.486   2.701   
 (1.657)   (1.587)   (1.996)   
Prev. exp. center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.106   -0.029   0.124   
 (1.302)   (1.446)   (0.984)   
Dir. following regional rebellion t-1  2.125   2.184   2.588  
  (0.946)**   (1.210)*   (1.401)*  
Dir. following center-seeking rebellion t-1  -0.354   -0.420   0.284  
  (1.149)   (1.205)   (1.381)  
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 -3.963 -1.387 -21.754 -3.437 -1.524 -25.277 -5.335 -3.632 -24.155 
 (1.710)** (0.948) (3.244)*** (1.872)* (1.071) (232.768) (2.854)* (1.726)** (8.595)*** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 1.924 1.305 -0.142 1.866 1.672 1.378 2.609 2.192 2.146 
 (1.490) (1.128) (1.363) (1.546) (1.137) (1.157) (1.664) (1.312)* (2.299) 
NxT 1,166 1,023 471 1,166 1,023 471 1,166 1,023 478 
Cubic splines Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Log of time No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Decade dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time polynomials No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-2, 4-5, and 7-9. Conditional logit model in column 3, 6, and9. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Alternative measure for military regimes 
The robustness tests below replicate our baseline models using an indicator of military 
regimes based on Geddes et al. (2014). Importantly, we depart from her schema in two 
ways. First, when a regime is classified by her as a hybrid regime, we recode the 
regime according to Lai and Slater (2006), who classify authoritarian regimes as one 
of four types: Strongman, Junta, Bossism, or Machine. We treat the first two types as 
instances of military regimes and the latter two types as party regimes. We make this 
departure from Geddes because her typology measures variation in regime type solely 
by how “access to office and the fruits of office” are allocated; that is, by military 
committee, party committee, or a single individual (Geddes 1999b, 121–122). Yet, 
authoritarian regimes should be differentiated by their executory powers and not just 
by their decision-making procedures. Doing so substantially reduces hybridization in 
the classification of all regime types. 
Second, and by similar reasoning, we recode regimes classified as purely 
personalist by Geddes as military regimes, since almost all cases of personalist 
regimes rely on the military to maintain power and execute policy. Where Geddes sees 
a strong party apparatus accompanying personal rule, she classifies it as a party- 
personalist hybrid. This lends added confidence that Geddes’ purely personalist 
regimes lack a ruling party that rivals the power of the military. 
The results of this robustness test are displayed in Table A21 and Table A22. 
Regarding military regime emergence, the findings using Geddes et al.’s data are 
nearly identical to our baseline model, both in the pooled and in the fixed effects 
regression. As for democratization, the results are much weaker using the alternative 
measure. While the coefficient of Regional rebellion (decay) is negative throughout, 
it only reaches levels of statistical significance in Table A22, column 4. This 
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underlines the fact that the results for military regime democratization should be 
viewed as suggestive, rather than conclusive.  
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Table A21: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (GWF data) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 1.029 1.023 0.838 0.937 1.944 
 
(0.430)** (0.429)** (0.450)* (0.444)** (0.757)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 0.701 0.699 0.651 0.710 0.857 
 
(0.316)** (0.317)** (0.325)** (0.323)** (0.567) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.431 -0.435 -0.606 -0.451 -2.674 
 
(0.201)** (0.200)** (0.237)** (0.285) (1.331)** 
Population size (log) t-1 0.043 0.050 -0.108 0.187 2.928 
 
(0.134) (0.134) (0.148) (0.330) (1.800) 
Polity t-1 -0.131 -0.131 -0.147 -0.146 -0.316 
 
(0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.050)*** 
Previous failures 0.008 0.008 0.007 -0.004 -0.157 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.078)** 
War (dummy) t-1  -0.339 -0.265 -0.128 0.444 
  
(0.755) (0.743) (0.753) (1.056) 
Unrest (log) t-1   0.780 0.806 0.602 
   
(0.193)*** (0.184)*** (0.253)** 
Rel. fractionalization t-1   -0.633 -0.506  
   
(0.804) (0.831) 
 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -7.806 -9.579 
    
(7.602) (41.881) 
NxT 4,382 4,382 4,293 4,103 1,183 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-4. Conditional logit model in column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A22: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (GWF data) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.333   0.723   
 
(0.789) 
  
(0.803) 
  
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.356   -0.021   
 
(0.489) 
  
(0.437) 
  
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  -1.606   -1.701  
  
(1.631) 
  
(1.706) 
 
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  -0.838   -0.502  
  
(0.607) 
  
(0.556) 
 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1   -0.569 -0.953 -0.926 -0.435 
   
(0.541) (0.578)* (0.771) (0.929) 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1   -0.980 -0.992 -0.658 -0.826 
   
(0.636) (0.622) (0.597) (1.649) 
NxT 1,337 951 1,337 1,337 951 548 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Alternative half-lives for our decaying variables 
To recall, our main variables measuring exposure to rebellions – regional and center-
seeking – are decaying variables with a half-life of one year, meaning that half of the 
effect decays after one year. To see if our findings are driven by this particular choice 
of half-life, we rerun our baseline models with alternative half-lives of two, three, and 
five years respectively. The results, displayed in Table A23-Table A28, are 
substantively identical to our baseline models, albeit slightly weaker in the case of 
military regime democratization with a half-life of five years.  
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Table A23: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (half-life 2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional rebellion (HL2, decay) t-1 1.004 1.014 0.898 0.876 2.283 
 
(0.436)** (0.432)** (0.423)** (0.409)** (1.027)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (HL2, decay) t-1 0.372 0.374 0.293 0.261 1.348 
 
(0.371) (0.371) (0.356) (0.360) (0.794)* 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.151 -0.152 -0.166 0.017 -0.774 
 
(0.238) (0.237) (0.233) (0.264) (0.890) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.038 0.041 -0.011 0.367 2.776 
 
(0.129) (0.126) (0.125) (0.216)* (2.113) 
Polity t-1 -0.127 -0.128 -0.142 -0.154 -0.408 
 
(0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.035)*** (0.096)*** 
Previous failures 0.195 0.196 0.165 0.126 -1.136 
 
(0.215) (0.216) (0.238) (0.251) (1.003) 
War (dummy) t-1  -0.143 0.039 0.370 0.337 
  
(0.770) (0.749) (0.742) (1.066) 
Unrest (log) t-1   0.482 0.516 -0.098 
   
(0.151)*** (0.155)*** (0.310) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1   -1.572 -1.685  
   
(0.694)** (0.748)** 
 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -10.185 -21.722 
    
(5.012)** (33.329) 
NxT 4,726 4,726 4,631 4,630 1,301 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-4. Conditional logit model in column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A24: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (half-life 2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.759   2.662   
 
(1.190) 
  
(2.030) 
  
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.844   -0.482   
 
(0.861) 
  
(1.809) 
  
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  0.650   1.847  
  
(0.879) 
  
(2.149) 
 
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  0.029   -0.923  
  
(1.483) 
  
(1.293) 
 
Regional rebellion (HL2, decay) t-1   -2.758 -4.340 -1.436 -13.441 
   
(1.524)* (1.951)** (2.053) (4.607)*** 
Center-seeking rebellion (HL2, decay) t-1   1.866 2.460 1.955 1.090 
   
(0.989)* (1.785) (1.086)* (2.333) 
NxT 1,166 1,023 1,166 1,166 1,023 471 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A25: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (half-life 3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional rebellion (HL3, decay) t-1 0.974 0.983 0.869 0.859 2.350 
 
(0.430)** (0.425)** (0.415)** (0.403)** (1.063)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (HL3, decay) t-1 0.363 0.366 0.293 0.259 1.474 
 
(0.375) (0.375) (0.362) (0.365) (0.833)* 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.146 -0.147 -0.161 0.023 -0.723 
 
(0.238) (0.237) (0.233) (0.265) (0.914) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.038 0.040 -0.012 0.368 2.832 
 
(0.130) (0.127) (0.126) (0.216)* (2.138) 
Polity t-1 -0.128 -0.128 -0.143 -0.154 -0.409 
 
(0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.035)*** (0.096)*** 
Previous failures 0.190 0.190 0.160 0.121 -1.177 
 
(0.217) (0.217) (0.239) (0.252) (1.010) 
War (dummy) t-1  -0.137 0.038 0.369 0.266 
  
(0.763) (0.746) (0.740) (1.079) 
Unrest (log) t-1   0.485 0.518 -0.099 
   
(0.152)*** (0.155)*** (0.315) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1   -1.568 -1.680  
   
(0.695)** (0.750)** 
 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -10.285 -23.936 
    
(5.034)** (34.249) 
NxT 4,726 4,726 4,631 4,630 1,301 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-4. Conditional logit model in column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A26: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (half-life 3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.759   3.107   
 
(1.190) 
  
(2.096) 
  
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.844   -0.769   
 
(0.861) 
  
(2.207) 
  
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  0.650   0.931  
  
(0.879) 
  
(2.894) 
 
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  0.029   -0.961  
  
(1.483) 
  
(1.290) 
 
Regional rebellion (HL3, decay) t-1   -2.791 -4.838 -0.529 -14.690 
   
(1.565)* (2.045)** (2.733) (15.613) 
Center-seeking rebellion (HL3, decay) t-1   1.872 2.758 2.090 2.548 
   
(0.992)* (2.116) (1.124)* (2.387) 
NxT 1,166 1,023 1,166 1,166 1,023 471 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A27: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (half-life 5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional rebellion (HL5, decay) t-1 0.930 0.938 0.826 0.837 2.381 
 
(0.419)** (0.414)** (0.404)** (0.395)** (1.119)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (HL5, decay) t-1 0.338 0.341 0.281 0.246 1.612 
 
(0.382) (0.382) (0.372) (0.375) (0.894)* 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.141 -0.142 -0.157 0.031 -0.659 
 
(0.237) (0.237) (0.233) (0.265) (0.945) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.039 0.041 -0.013 0.373 2.862 
 
(0.130) (0.128) (0.127) (0.217)* (2.172) 
Polity t-1 -0.128 -0.128 -0.143 -0.155 -0.410 
 
(0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.035)*** (0.096)*** 
Previous failures 0.182 0.183 0.151 0.114 -1.214 
 
(0.220) (0.220) (0.242) (0.255) (1.011) 
War (dummy) t-1  -0.130 0.034 0.367 0.156 
  
(0.751) (0.741) (0.736) (1.087) 
Unrest (log) t-1   0.488 0.520 -0.098 
   
(0.152)*** (0.155)*** (0.322) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1   -1.559 -1.671  
   
(0.696)** (0.754)** 
 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -10.482 -26.702 
    
(5.076)** (35.579) 
NxT 4,726 4,726 4,631 4,630 1,301 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-4. Conditional logit model in column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A28: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (half-life 5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.759   3.951   
 
(1.190) 
  
(2.284)* 
  
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.844   -1.167   
 
(0.861) 
  
(2.944) 
  
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  0.650   0.011  
  
(0.879) 
  
(3.018) 
 
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  0.029   -0.948  
  
(1.483) 
  
(1.296) 
 
Regional rebellion (HL5, decay) t-1   -2.673 -5.794 0.341 -35.328 
   
(1.632) (2.366)** (2.805) (36.325) 
Center-seeking rebellion (HL5, decay) t-1   1.767 3.134 2.185 4.311 
   
(0.985)* (2.832) (1.198)* (3.421) 
NxT 1,166 1,023 1,166 1,166 1,023 471 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Influential observations 
To ensure that our results are not solely driven by a few influential observations, we 
rerun our regressions while dropping observations with particularly high leverage. To 
identify these observations, we are using Pregibon’s dbeta which provides information 
on the influence on parameter estimates of each individual observation. There is no 
critical value for this measure and influential observations have to be identified using 
eyeballing. In light of Figure A7, Pakistan (cowcode770) and Thailand (cowcode 800) 
seem to contain influential observations. Figure A8 highlights Argentina (cowcode 
160) and Greece (cowcode 350) as influential observations. We therefore remove 
these countries from the regression and rerun our baseline models. The results shown 
in Table A29 and Table A30 are substantively identical to our core findings, albeit 
slightly weaker in both cases. We thus conclude that our results are not a pure artefact 
of a few high-leverage observations. 
 
Figure A7: Influential observations for military regime emergence 
 
Note: Labels represent cowcode-years.  
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Figure A8: Influential observations for military regime democratization 
 
Note: Labels represent cowcode-years.  
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Table A29: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (w/o influential 
observations) 
 (1) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.793 
 
(0.451)* 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 0.444 
 
(0.363) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.169 
 
(0.249) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.330 
 
(0.224) 
Polity t-1 -0.144 
 
(0.034)*** 
War (dummy) t-1 0.163 
 
(0.883) 
Unrest (log) t-1 0.562 
 
(0.162)*** 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 -1.585 
 
(0.755)** 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 -10.092 
 
(5.103)** 
Previous failures -0.089 
 
(0.250) 
NxT 4,368 
Time polynomials Yes 
Regional dummies Yes 
Pooled logit model replicating column 4, Table 1 in main article, without Pakistan and 
Thailand. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A30: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (w/o 
influential observations) 
 (1) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 1.717 
 
(2.193) 
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 -1.823 
 
(1.117) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 -4.259 
 
(2.371)* 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 2.350 
 
(1.484) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 0.011 
 
(0.854) 
Population size (log) t-1 -0.075 
 
(1.059) 
Polity t-1 1.034 
 
(0.218)*** 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 -4.079 
 
(20.354) 
Unrest (log) t-1 0.156 
 
(0.668) 
War (dummy) t-1 -3.257 
 
(1.705)* 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 12.127 
 
(3.967)*** 
Number of previous regime failures 0.979 
 
(0.521)* 
NxT 1,144 
Time polynomials Yes 
Regional dummies Yes 
Pooled logit model replicating column 4, Table 4 in main article, without Argentina 
and Greece. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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